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DH is Us or on the Unbearable Lightness  
of a Shared Methodology 
Jan Christoph Meister  
Abstract: »Wir sind die Digitalen Geisteswissenschaften oder Die unerträgli-
che Leichtigkeit einer geteilten Methodologie«. In practice the Digital Humani-
ties are methodologically defined by the principle of digital conceptualization 
of the objects and procedures of research. Who embarks upon Digital Humani-
ties considers the objects of study implicitly as a complex of discrete measura-
ble states, to apply, based upon this, computer based procedures: analytical, 
symbolizing or modeling. This mode of digital conceptualization of humanistic 
topics of research can in principle be used within all disciplines, as a digital 
lingua franca. Before this background we formulate two theses: (1) This me-
thodological theoretical claim of universality has to be relativized by the Digi-
tal Humanities community through critical reflection of methodology; digital 
access does not turn out to be appropriate everywhere, when we make the spe-
cifically humanistic drive for knowledge the yardstick of a cost-benefit analy-
sis. (2) The trans-disciplinary nature of the Digital Humanities may be politi-
cally “unbearable” by tendency from the perspective of traditional Humanities’ 
disciplines, as it challenges their disciplinary identity. For the Digital Humani-
ties community both of these theses lead to the obligation to engage in a criti-
cal self reflexion of their own methods – and open the dialogue with the estab-
lished humanistic disciplines against its backdrop. 
Keywords: Digital Humanities, Digital Philology, transdisciplinary methodol-
ogy, modelling. 
 
Identity crises abound: until yesterday we did Humanities Computing, today 
it’s Digital Humanities, and the more common our practice becomes the shorter 
and less descriptive its designation seems to get, as the somewhat opaque ne-
ologism eHumanities proves. From a linguistic and philosophical point of view 
the change in terminology, and in particular the emerging next-generation 
terminology, signals a gradual naturalization of the concept by way of an ob-
scuration of the predicate-argument structure. The evolving newspeak adds to 
the plethora of terminological nouveau vague constructs whose differentia 
specifica is marked by a single letter. From iPhone to iHumanities is but a step.  
Before we really take the plunge and begin to refer to ourselves as iHuman-
ists, let us use this opportunity to throw a spanner, half philological and half 
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philosophical, into the works of discipline formation-by-designation. In order 
to discuss the “scope of the Digital Humanities” and the question of the “rela-
tionship between individual disciplines served by them”, as is my task, I need 
to sketch out what I mean when I speak of the Digital, of the Humanities, and 
of disciplines.  
In a language-philosophical perspective a change in denominator also indi-
cates a semantic shift, an accentuation that usually reflects a change in a lan-
guage community’s practice, in what people do and associate when they use a 
term. Scientific communities are by definition also language communities in 
that each of them develops a specific terminology. As regards the transforma-
tion from Humanities Computing and logically (not historically) derived terms, 
such as Literary Computing or Historical Computing, to the new generic label 
Digital Humanities, one might say that we have progressed from a predicative 
to a substantive focus in our language use. Humanities Computing was a label 
that employed the noun Humanities – in itself a classifier for a set of academic 
disciplines perhaps best defined in terms of a family resemblance (Fami-
lienähnlichkeit as Wittgenstein would say) – in order to predicate a particular 
variant of Computing. Note that the latter term, at least in this combination, was 
mainly meant in the metaphorical sense of “using machines that can calculate” 
rather than in the original sense of “the human cognitive ability to abstract 
quantitative reasoning.” 
The second generation term Digital Humanities then turned this predicate-
argument structure on its head. Now it is a sub-set within the Humanities that is 
predicated in terms of a common methodological characteristic shared by all of 
its elements, i.e.: the various Humanities disciplines subsumed under the label. 
The identifying commonality of the elements in this set is their being Digital. 
However, the actual extension of this predication is rather vague: it is not easy 
to clarify what it means for something to be digital, or to be ascribed the quali-
ty of being digital – in particular when that something is not a material object 
or an identifiable phenomenon, but rather a set of practices. Would it make 
sense to talk, strictu sensu, of Blue Humanities? Certainly not, the categories 
do not match. But Critical Humanities does sound feasible, and so does a hypo-
thetical counter term such as Affirmative Humanities. Our intuition tells us that 
being critical or being non-critical or affirmative are qualities which “the Hu-
manities” – whatever they are – may very well possess, because practices can 
be critical etc. But they cannot be blue; only material or ideal entities, from 
blue lagoon to blue moon, can take on that quality, be it literal or metaphorical. 
Unfortunately, if we follow this line of reasoning then Digital Humanities 
proves a particularly problematic candidate. To begin with, both practices and 
entities can be meaningfully labeled digital. But then what exactly does it mean 
for something to be digital? 
It is perhaps easier to approach this question ex negativo. Digital does not 
mean: it can only exist on my iPad. Modern technology and media, as impor-
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tant as they have been for the proliferation of digital objects and approaches, 
are the eggs and not the hen. Digital does mean: conceptualized (if it is an 
object), or conceptualizing (if it is a practice), in a specific way. This funda-
mental methodological principle of digitality, so to speak, is discreteness. A 
digital representation of something renders its object in terms of a sum of dis-
crete observations: “on” at t1, “off” at t2; “black” at pixel position 1, “blue” at 
pixel position 2, and so forth. An analogue representation, by contrast, lacks 
discreteness – but it compensates for the fine-grained exactness of the digital 
by offering wholeness and a Gestalt oriented conceptualization to which we as 
humans will respond in a more intuitive, less analytical fashion. Obviously, the 
intrinsic methodological and conceptual cohesiveness of the analogue and its 
aesthetic lure is at the same time its phenomenological forte and its analytical 
boundary condition. The more fine-grained digital analyses and representations 
of objects and phenomena have become, and the more our technologies for re-
assembling digital data into synthetic wholes that can trick our senses into 
taking the representation for the real thing have advanced, the less conscious 
we are of the underlying distinction. However, the philosophical issue of the 
distinction digital vs. analogue remains. We cannot have our cake and eat it. Or 
can we?  
As modes of conceptualization, both the analogue and the digital have their 
pros and cons. They are good for different things. Digital conceptualizations, 
because they are based upon phenomenological atoms, can be completely de- 
and re-constructed; they are highly manipulable and can be aggregated to serve 
purposes – intellectual as well as practical – which we might not even have 
anticipated at their point of origin. In other words, the digital method has an 
inherent capacity to transcend its original methodological context (though there 
are, of course, technical limitations), whereas the analogue will in principle 
result in a historical, contextually grounded conceptualization that does not 
tolerate being taken apart and re-assembled ad libitum. On the other hand, the 
digital information atom holds no surprises – it is what it is, and being fully 
defined already at its point of origin it cannot carry any implicit information. In 
the digital realm, novelty can only be construed by way of recombination; 
whereas the analogue, which stops functioning as an information bearer if you 
break it down below modular level, by virtue of its fuzzyness, derives a capaci-
ty for innovation from being under-specified. An analogue representation is 
open to interpretation; it presents itself as a multi-layered model of something 
in which different dimensions and aspects can become foregrounded depending 
on varying research interest and context. The intellectual tension between the 
digital and the analogue thus amounts to a juxtaposition of two highly produc-
tive methodological principles: analytic exactness vs. hermeneutic contingency. 
As meaning-oriented, hermeneutic disciplines, modern age humanities share 
a common anthropological interest. Their goal is no longer to explain the cos-
mos, but to document, to study and to interpret man’s cognitive and emotional 
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reaction to the physical, the social, the intellectual and the spiritual context in 
which all humans are embedded. Unlike the social sciences, the humanities 
tend to base their research not on actual observable human behavior, but main-
ly on the cultural and aesthetic output which we produce in terms of artifacts, 
codifications and routines, buildings, texts, music, rituals, political structures, 
languages etc. And because of the prevailing focus on the meaningful whole 
which the underlying hermeneutic motive enforces, the humanities have always 
been the de facto flag-bearers of the analogue. To refer to the traditional (as 
opposed to: the digital) humanities as Analogue Humanities would not only 
sound funny – it would in fact be a tautology. 
And that puts us as Digital Humanists in a really difficult position when 
confronted by our traditionalist colleagues. The problem is not a question of 
convincing them that we have useful tools, repositories and analytic practices 
to offer. We have already reached the stage where practically no aspiring hu-
manist of any discipline can afford to ignore the digital paradigm, if only be-
cause DH has suddenly found a very persuasive ally in the funding agencies. 
But that is a cynical argument, and it will no longer hold when politicians latch 
onto the next social trend anyhow. The problem that we encounter in our en-
counter with the traditional disciplines and their practitioners is to convince 
them that we are, still, real humanists. The issue is not pragmatics – it is ideol-
ogy.  
Against this background I would now like to address two questions central 
to our current debate. One, “What is the scope of the Digital Humanities?” 
Two, “What is the relationship between individual disciplines served by 
them?” 
Thesis One: The Scope of the Digital Humanities is 
Universal – But Its Practice Shouldn’t Be 
I do not think that, considering the object domain of the various humanities 
disciplines in its entirety, there is anything – any type of phenomenon, any type 
of object real or abstract – that cannot, in principle, be conceptualized in a 
digital mode: that is, using the fundamentally digital approach of segmenting a 
whole into discrete observational and representational information atoms. 
Some things may not be do-able technologically now, but they will be tomor-
row. And once that basis has been established, analytical, heuristic and even 
hermeneutic (interpretational) operations can follow.  
Of course, the further we move away from material objects and into the 
realm of the cognitive and emotive, from the empirical analysis to the herme-
neutic and speculative, the harder and more controversial this transformation 
may become. It is one thing to claim that you can produce a walk-through 3D-
model of the Aphaia-Tempel on Aegina and to demonstrate how this approach 
can be useful to a research team of archaeologists that happen to work at differ-
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ent physical locations. It is another to prove to colleagues who do not share our 
conviction that, say, a Medievalist study in the historical transformation of an 
abstract concept such as “knightly honour” will benefit from “going digital”. 
“Honour” is more than just the sequence of ASCII symbols that represent it in 
the English or any other language – it is a word, a practice, a norm, it can be 
expressed metaphorically or allegorically, its study requires semantic markup 
of representational objects, and so on. Yet as we are not dealing with the phe-
nomenon of “Honour” per se, but rather with the various expressions that it 
takes in symbolic artefacts, we still have a foothold in the material world.  
However, whether it does indeed make sense to approach every humanistic 
research question from a Digital Humanities angle is quite another question. 
Conceptually as well as technologically, this decision should always be based 
on a cost-benefit analysis. As regards technology, this is easily done – com-
puters, software, networks and their operation and maintenance demand the 
availability of quantifiable resources such as time and money. But the concep-
tual cost-benefit analysis has so far remained one of the truly blind spots of the 
Digital Humanities. Taken on a whole, the amount of energy that our commu-
nity invests into theoretical and methodological critique of its practices and 
their limitations is still disproportionally low. Things are slowly changing 
though: ten years ago, when DH was still firmly in the grip of Anglo-American 
inspired pragmatism and gung-ho technological optimism, we could only listen 
to the lone voices of the likes of Willard McCarty, Jerome McGann or Dino 
Buzzetti; today the next generation of Digital Humanists, represented by 
younger colleagues such as Melissa Terras or Julia Flanders, has already seam-
lessly integrated their interest in the do-able with pronounced methodological 
reflection on the why, the how, and the what for. DH practice and reflection 
have begun to go hand in hand. We are nowhere near there yet, but we are on 
the right track.  
To my mind, this is a crucial aspect which we must bear in mind when we 
discuss the formation of Digital Humanities curricula. Like any methodology, 
Digital Humanities can only benefit from a better developed understanding of 
what it is conceptually good at, and what kind of questions it should not dabble 
with. Self-reflection and methodological critique are as important as the devel-
opment and teaching of practices, skills, models and techniques.  
Investment into this critical meta-discourse is important not only because it 
helps us, the practitioners of DH, to advance in our respective fields of re-
search. Equally important is the communicative purpose: for methodological 
reflection is the quintessential philosophical point of contact among all humani-
ties disciplines. It is one thing to realize that another discipline or method can 
be instrumentalized for your own purpose – it is quite another to engage with it 
on the equal footing of philosophical and fundamental methodological debate. 
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Thesis Two: Digital Humanities Faces the Traditional 
Disciplines with the ‘Unbearable Lightness 
of a Shared Methodology’ 
The humanistic disciplines as we find them at Western universities today are 
basically a European invention of the 19th century. Even the disciplinary late 
comers – from Critical Philosophy to Feminist Studies and others – have by 
and large tried to emulated that model. But what exactly is an academic disci-
pline?  
The phrasing of the question points to a common essentialist misunderstand-
ing. As Lorraine Daston and others have argued1, academic disciplines are 
social institutions that are defined by their goals and practices rather than just 
by their object domain and their intellectual ‘software’ and ‘hardware’. In the 
former perspective, a typical humanities discipline is characterized by at least 
the following: 
- a defined (but not necessarily exclusive) object domain 
- a defined research orientation and methodological frame work 
- a developed terminology and taxonomy 
- a set of practices, routines, methods and theories 
- institutional manifestation in terms of entities (e.g., university departments), 
structures (e.g., degree courses) and facilities (e.g., libraries, museums, ob-
ject repositories) 
- an organized discursive community (e.g., academic organizations) and a 
communicative infrastructure (e.g., journals) 
This list is certainly not exhaustive. But it already helps us to get a clearer 
picture of the potential areas of impact in which the confrontation of the tradi-
tional disciplines with the DH can make itself felt. 
A fully developed Digital Humanities is bound to cut across almost all of 
the above categories, and as a shared methodology it becomes applicable irre-
spective of any of the specifics that a traditional definition of discipline might 
hitherto have relied upon in order to maintain its identity. In my title I have 
qualified this impact an “unbearable lightness”, not only because one’s bound 
to get some rhetorical mileage out of an allusion to Nietzsche and Kundera 
                                                             
1  See Lorraine Daston: Wunder, Tatsachen, Beweise. Zur Geschichte der Rationalität. Frank-
furt a.M.: Fischer 2001, 22f. – Also: Lorraine Daston: Die Akademien und die Einheit der 
Wissenschaften. Die Disziplinierung der Disziplinen. In: Jürgen Kocka et al. (Hg.): Die 
Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin im Kaiserreich. Berlin: Aka-
demie Verlag 1999, 61-84. Daston points out the problematic relationship between the tra-
ditional academies and the newly formed disciplines as competing institutions. On the 
process of discipline formation in a Marxist perspective see Martin Guntau/Hubert Laitko: 
Entstehung und Wesen wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen. In: Martin Guntau/Hubert Laitko 
(Hg.): Der Ursprung der modernen Wissenschaften. Studien zur Entstehung wissen-
schaftlicher Disziplinen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1987, 17-89. 
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anyhow, but because the confrontation with DH methodology does indeed open 
a prospect to the traditional disciplines that is liberating and frightening at the 
same time.  
My own focus as an advocate of DH is, of course, decidedly on the liberat-
ing aspect. I believe that by conceptualizing our diverse cultural objects digi-
tally and by developing analytical and representational tools and techniques for 
their investigation and manipulation that share the same fundamental principle, 
we have – possibly for the first time in human history – found a way to model 
the entire phenomenal spectrum from the concrete and material to the highly 
abstract by using one and the same ‘language’. In other words, I believe that 
the digital is bound to become a sort of new lingua franca across the humani-
ties, and perhaps even across all sciences. At present it still operates, meta-
phorically speaking, at the level of ‘machine language’: While we are good at 
the quantitative, we still lack the experience to translate many of the traditional, 
mainly qualitative research questions of our colleagues into the language that is 
spoken by digital humanists, and vice versa. Perhaps – and this would be a 
question for a historian of science – the impact of the digital onto our scholarly 
practices might even help to re-create a universal inter-disciplinary discourse 
practice as it existed across Europe when everyone spoke Latin, thus uncon-
sciously operating in a shared conceptual environment. The paradigmatic 19th 
century disciplines, because of the political motivation that led to their forma-
tion as societal institutions, were nation oriented, and the resistance to the de 
facto hegemony of English as the new academic lingua franca which is still 
being upheld proves that we have not really managed to resolve the question of 
how to re-establish a universal discourse community.  
However, the issue of national languages is only a surface problem. The 
more fundamental one has to do with the restrictions inherent to any natural 
language, for natural languages have a natural bias toward – language. They are 
just not very good at capturing phenomena that are encoded in, say, material 
objects or performative symbolic practices. This is a problem that even Latin 
would not have helped us with. The non-natural language of the digital, how-
ever, might do the trick.  
So what is ‘unbearable’ about this? You might ask. The inherent risk for the 
traditional humanities disciplines becomes apparent when we consider the 
bigger picture of universities and academic disciplines at the beginning of the 
21st century, and the role which the humanities play within them. In many 
countries the humanities are under severe pressure to legitimate themselves. 
Foreign language and literature departments are a case in point. Where I work 
at present, my discipline – German Studies – is of course not in a precarious 
position. But I have also worked in a German Studies department in another 
country, and during a period of fundamental political and economical re-
orientation which lead to the complete marginalization of my department. 
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(Ironically enough, it was in that context that my own interest in Humanities 
Computing arose.)  
Moreover, even where disciplinary existence is not at stake, reputation and 
social acknowledgment are, and so is last, but not least: funding. There is a 
fierce competition at play which we cannot ignore. All of these are contextual 
aspects which, in a strategic perspective, ought to be considered by the Digital 
Humanities community. How we relate to the established traditional disciplines 
is a question that does have a political dimension, and it would be naïve to 
ignore it. And while we are on naivety: there have of course also been other so-
called paradigm shifts that were pronounced with the highest of expectations – 
the linguistic turn, the narrative turn, the critical turn – and which started out 
with the vision of becoming the next super-discipline. Like economies, disci-
plines and methodologies go through boom cycles, and DH is right in the midst 
of one. Which means that sustainability should be of prime concern. Again, I 
do not mean sustainability in terms of infrastructure (we are doing pretty well 
in that regard), but rather in terms of conceptual and theoretical foundations. 
All of these might seem to be questions that should be addressed by organi-
zations such as the Alliance of Digital Humanities Organizations, or by the 
existing and emerging regional organizations such as ALLC, ACH, DHD. But 
it does also make sense to raise them on the individual level, because they have 
already begun to affect us. For me the question is: What do I want to communi-
cate and to achieve when I who, by virtue of my training as well as of my insti-
tutional affiliation, am based in Modern German Literature and who already 
combines this institutional identity with a theoretical affiliation to Narratology, 
term my philological practice as falling under the methodological scope of 
Digital Humanities? 
Some of my colleagues are not convinced that I am still in German Studies; 
they are polite enough not to tell me openly, but I can read their minds. And to 
be honest, more and more often I share their doubt, though I don’t tell them 
either because I truly share their fascination for German literature. I just can’t 
help it – I want to have my cake and eat it, too. And that, in a nutshell, is DH 
for me: a methodology that cuts across disciplines, systematically as well as 
conceptually. 
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